Epsilon-equilibria of perturbed games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Epsilon-equilibria of perturbed games
zbMATH Open document ID: 1279.91012
author: Matthew O. Jackson
author: Xu Tan
author: Tomas Rodriguez-Barraquer
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2012-05-14T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
zbMATH DE Number: 6034660
zbMATH Keywords: epsilon-equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: epsilon-Nash equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: electronic mail game
zbMATH Keywords: global games
zbMATH Keywords: Bayesian games
zbMATH Keywords: trembling-hand perfection
zbMATH Keywords: Nash equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: lower hemi-continuity
MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile
full work available at URL: j.geb.2011.09.007
OpenAlex ID: W3122879897
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2011.09.007
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6034660