``The liberal paradox: A generalization'' by D. Kelsey
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: ``The liberal paradox: A generalization'' by D. Kelsey
zbMATH Open document ID: 0641.90008
DOI: 10.1007/BF00433947
author: I. D. A. Macintyre
published in: Social Choice and Welfare
publication date: 1987-01-01T00:00:00Z
review text: This paper examines a particular sort of social decision process. It examines those processes which ackowledge rights as a matter of electoral process. But it also examines a subclass of such voting schemes. In particular it requires that no matter how votes are cast, and no matter how votes are allocated: (1) Unanimity should always be respected; (2) the voting procedure should deliver a choice set. (It is the second of those requirements that generates impossibility results.) The precise focus of this paper is on rights and unanimous judgements which may be brought about by strategic misrepresentation. Thus I may be able to exercise a right over two alternatives, x and y, but the exercise may be a result of a strategic misrepresentation. The paper considers whether the strategic burden thus imposed an voters, ensures that a choice set is always generated by the voting system. In fact for 3 alternatives, any of the preferences in Sen rights cases [see \textit{A. K. Sen}, ``Collective choice and social welfare'' (1970; Zbl 0227.90011)] can accommodate these strategic expressions. It follows that Sen's paradox holds under ``non-imposition''.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 4045431
zbMATH Keywords: social decision process
zbMATH Keywords: Unanimity
zbMATH Keywords: rights
zbMATH Keywords: strategic misrepresentation
zbMATH Keywords: non-imposition
MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile
cites work: The liberal paradox: A generalisation
cites work: Q5635232
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4045431