The paradox of inference and the non-triviality of analytic information
It is well known (see Carnap, Bar-Hillel) that analytically/logically true sentences lack informational content. One consequence is that the conclusion of a valid argument brings no information which would not be contained in premises. The author solves the resulting ``paradox of inference'' by distinguishing between empirical and analytic information. This is realized on the basis of Transparent Intensional Logic (TIL), which is an extensional hyperintensional system enabling us to treat abstract procedures (in TIL defined as ``constructions'') as objects sui generis. Constructions as structured meanings of expressions prescribe how to arrive at respective truth-values so that analytically equivalent sentences may possess distinct analytic contents. Thus we can see that the empirical content of the conclusion of a valid argument is contained in the premises but its analytic content may be distinct.
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5809614