The paradox of inference and the non-triviality of analytic information
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: The paradox of inference and the non-triviality of analytic information
zbMATH Open document ID: 1221.03010
author: Marie Duží
published in: Journal of Philosophical Logic
publication date: 2010-11-03T00:00:00Z
review text: It is well known (see Carnap, Bar-Hillel) that analytically/logically true sentences lack informational content. One consequence is that the conclusion of a valid argument brings no information which would not be contained in premises. The author solves the resulting ``paradox of inference'' by distinguishing between empirical and analytic information. This is realized on the basis of Transparent Intensional Logic (TIL), which is an extensional hyperintensional system enabling us to treat abstract procedures (in TIL defined as ``constructions'') as objects sui generis. Constructions as structured meanings of expressions prescribe how to arrive at respective truth-values so that analytically equivalent sentences may possess distinct analytic contents. Thus we can see that the empirical content of the conclusion of a valid argument is contained in the premises but its analytic content may be distinct.
reviewed by: Pavel Materna
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 03A05
zbMATH DE Number: 5809614
zbMATH Keywords: analytic information
zbMATH Keywords: empirical information
zbMATH Keywords: paradox of inference
zbMATH Keywords: transparent intensional logic
zbMATH Keywords: construction
zbMATH Keywords: hyperintension
zbMATH Keywords: structured meaning
MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile
full work available at URL: s10992-010-9127-5
OpenAlex ID: W2140962753
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DOI: 10.1007/S10992-010-9127-5
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5809614