Inefficiency of random serial dictatorship under incomplete information
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Inefficiency of random serial dictatorship under incomplete information
zbMATH Open document ID: 1530.91239
author: Ethem Akyol
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2023-11-17T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B32
zbMATH DE Number: 7767481
zbMATH Keywords: allocation without transfers
zbMATH Keywords: Bayesian incentive compatibility
zbMATH Keywords: random serial dictatorship
zbMATH Keywords: random Boston mechanism
MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile
full work available at URL: j.jet.2023.105741
OpenAlex ID: W4386865414
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2023.105741
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7767481