Strategyproof mechanism for two-sided matching with resource allocation
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Strategyproof mechanism for two-sided matching with resource allocation
author: Kwei-guu Liu
author: Kentaro Yahiro
author: Makoto Yokoo
published in: Artificial Intelligence
publication date: 2023-06-19T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 68Txx
zbMATH DE Number: 7697289
zbMATH Keywords: matching
zbMATH Keywords: resource allocation
zbMATH Keywords: strategyproofness
MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile
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DOI: 10.1016/J.ARTINT.2023.103855
copyright license: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7697289