Symmetric reduced-form voting
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Symmetric reduced-form voting
author: Xu Lang
author: Debasis Mishra
published in: Theoretical Economics
publication date: 2024-07-02T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91-XX
zbMATH DE Number: 7874770
zbMATH Keywords: reduced-form voting
zbMATH Keywords: unanimous voting
zbMATH Keywords: ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility
zbMATH Keywords: monotone reduced form
MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile
cites work: Efficient Computation of Optimal Auctions via Reduced Forms
cites work: PARETO EFFICIENCY AND WEIGHTED MAJORITY RULES
cites work: Voting by Committees
cites work: Equitable Voting Rules
cites work: Implementation of Reduced Form Auctions: A Geometric Approach
cites work: Reduced form auctions revisited
cites work: Generalized Reduced-Form Auctions: A Network-Flow Approach
cites work: Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible representations of committees
cites work: On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation
cites work: Reduced form implementation for environments with value interdependencies
cites work: Extreme Points and Majorization: Economic Applications
cites work: Mechanism design with costly verification and limited punishments
cites work: Mechanism design with financially constrained agents and costly verification
cites work: Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatible Voting Rules
cites work: Bayesian and Dominant-Strategy Implementation in the Independent Private-Values Model
cites work: Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
cites work: On the Implementability of Reduced Form Auctions
cites work: A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
cites work: Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in restricted domains
cites work: The veil of public ignorance
cites work: Optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers
cites work: An extreme point characterization of random strategy-proof social choice functions: the two alternative case
cites work: The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule
cites work: Q3100563
DOI: 10.3982/TE5400
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7874770