A solution for abstract decision problems based on maximum flow value
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: A solution for abstract decision problems based on maximum flow value
zbMATH Open document ID: 1542.91065
author: Michele Gori
published in: Mathematical Social Sciences
publication date: 2024-08-19T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B06
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 7898514
zbMATH Keywords: abstract decision problem
zbMATH Keywords: admissible set
zbMATH Keywords: generalized stable set
zbMATH Keywords: maximum flow
zbMATH Keywords: Copeland set
zbMATH Keywords: Copeland method
MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile
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DOI: 10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2024.05.003
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7898514