Collective decision making
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Collective decision making
zbMATH Open document ID: 1547.68757
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-06164-7_18
author: Sylvain Bouveret
author: Jérôme Lang
author: Michel Lemaître
publication date: 2024-09-11T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 68T42
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 68T20
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B06
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B32
zbMATH DE Number: 7910853
MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7910853