Cognitive hierarchies for games in extensive form
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Cognitive hierarchies for games in extensive form
zbMATH Open document ID: 1544.91048
author: Po-Hsuan Lin
author: Thomas R. Palfrey
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2024-09-13T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A18
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A26
zbMATH DE Number: 7913048
zbMATH Keywords: cognitive hierarchy
zbMATH Keywords: extensive form
zbMATH Keywords: learning
zbMATH Keywords: centipede game
MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2024.105871
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7913048