Population Lorenz-monotonic allocation schemes for TU-games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Population Lorenz-monotonic allocation schemes for TU-games
author: Josep M. Izquierdo
author: Jesús Montes
author: Carlos Rafels
published in: Social Choice and Welfare
publication date: 2024-10-25T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
zbMATH DE Number: 7932118
MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile
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DOI: 10.1007/S00355-024-01538-X
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7932118