A dynamic mechanism and surplus extraction under ambiguity
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: A dynamic mechanism and surplus extraction under ambiguity
zbMATH Open document ID: 1195.91050
author: S. K. Bose
author: Arup Daripa
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2009-09-14T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: 1931.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 5603597
zbMATH Keywords: ambiguity aversion
zbMATH Keywords: epsilon contamination
zbMATH Keywords: modified Dutch auction
zbMATH Keywords: dynamic mechanism
zbMATH Keywords: surplus extraction
zbMATH Keywords: revelation principle
MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile
OpenAlex ID: W2128529756
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2009.02.003
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5603597