Pages that link to "Item:Q1876659"

The following pages link to Core many-to-one matchings by fixed-point methods (Q1876659):

Displaying 15 items.

• Core of the assignment game via fixed point methods (Q533916) (← links)
• Agreement toward stability in matching markets (Q766251) (← links)
• A cumulative offer process for supply chain networks (Q826047) (← links)
• Contracts versus salaries in matching: a general result (Q900445) (← links)
• Core of coalition formation games and fixed-point methods (Q904830) (← links)
• Finding all stable matchings with couples (Q908185) (← links)
• Why do stable clearinghouses work so well? -- Small sets of stable matchings in typical environments, and the limits-on-manipulation theorem of Demange, Gale and Sotomayor (Q908186) (← links)
• On the complexity of an expanded Tarski's fixed point problem under the componentwise ordering (Q1637226) (← links)
• Lone wolves in infinite, discrete matching markets (Q1651278) (← links)
• A top dog tale with preference complementarities (Q1652838) (← links)
• Stable matchings and fixed points in trading networks: a note (Q1673527) (← links)
• Paths to stability for college admissions with budget constraints (Q1677256) (← links)
• Equivalences between two matching models: stability (Q1714490) (← links)
• The lattice of envy-free matchings (Q1753285) (← links)
• Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions (Q2482681) (← links)