Stable marriage with multi-modal preferences
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Cites work
- A characterization of the single-crossing domain
- A Multivariate Complexity Analysis of Lobbying in Multiple Referenda
- A Polynomial Time Algorithm for Unidimensional Unfolding Representations
- A polynomial-time randomized reduction from tournament isomorphism to tournament asymmetry
- Algorithmics of matching under preferences. With a foreword by Kurt Mehlhorn
- An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation
- Are there any nicely structured preference profiles nearby?
- Assessing the computational complexity of multi-layer subgraph detection
- Average parameterization and partial kernelization for computing medians
- Bistable versions of the marriages and roommates problems
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- College admissions with stable score-limits
- Fundamentals of parameterized complexity
- Hard variants of stable marriage.
- Hardness Results for Tournament Isomorphism and Automorphism
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- Jointly stable matchings
- Matching under preferences
- Multidimensional Manhattan preferences
- On limited nondeterminism and the complexity of the V-C dimension
- Parameterized algorithms
- Parametrized complexity theory.
- Recognizing one-dimensional Euclidean preference profiles
- Stable marriage and indifference
- Stable marriage with general preferences
- Stable matching with preferences derived from a psychological model
- Stable matching with uncertain linear preferences
- Stable matching with uncertain pairwise preferences
- Stable roommate with narcissistic, single-peaked, and single-crossing preferences
- The one-dimensional Euclidean domain: finitely many obstructions are not enough
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