Stable matching with interviews

DOI10.4230/LIPICS.ITCS.2025.12MaRDI QIDQ7296642zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Itai Ashlagi, Jiale Chen, Mohammad Roghani, Amin Saberi

Publication date 14 July 2026

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPICS.ITCS.2025.12

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Theory of computing (68Qxx)

Cites work

• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• On likely solutions of a stable marriage problem
• Randomness and fairness in two-sided matching with limited interviews
• Stable matching with incomplete information
• The short-side advantage in random matching markets
• Varying the number of signals in matching markets

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