Stable matchings under relaxed random preferences
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Cites work
- Algorithmics of matching under preferences. With a foreword by Kurt Mehlhorn
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Flexible Bayesian analysis of first price auctions using a simulated likelihood
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3152611 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3736679 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 45086 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3349081 (Why is no real title available?)
- Mariages stables et leurs relations avec d'autres problèmes combinatoires. Introduction à l'analyse mathématique des algorithmes
- On constrained matchings, stable under random preferences
- On likely solutions of a stable marriage problem
- On Likely Solutions of the Stable Matching Problem with Unequal Numbers of Men and Women
- On random stable partitions
- Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large
- The Average Number of Stable Matchings
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