Starting small and renegotiation

DOI10.1006/JETH.1998.2487MaRDI QIDQ1289252zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Joel Watson

Publication date 27 May 1999

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1998.2487

zbMATH Keywords

long-term partnershiptwo-sided incomplete information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05)

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Cites work

• A Theory of Credibility
• An abstract two-period game with simultaneous signaling -- existence of separating equilibria
• Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics
• Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project
• Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4207367 (Why is no real title available?)
• Joint Projects without Commitment
• Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
• Planning under Incomplete Information and the Ratchet Effect
• Ratifiable mechanisms: Learning from disagreement
• Starting small and commitment
• The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values

Cited in

(20)

• Endogenous institutional selection, building trust, and economic growth
• Bargaining power in repeated games
• A model of gradual information disclosure
• Stag hunt with unknown outside options
• Starting small to communicate
• Too good to fire: non-assortative matching to play a dynamic game
• Cooperation under incomplete information on the discount factors
• Even up: maintaining relationships
• Building rational cooperation
• Building trust: the costs and benefits of gradualism
• Starting small in project choice: a discrete-time setting with a continuum of types
• Signaling in social network and social capital formation
• Posterior renegotiation-proofness in a two-person decision problem
• OPTIMAL PAYMENT CONTRACTS IN TRADE RELATIONSHIPS
• Dynamic group formation in the repeated prisoner's dilemma
• Starting small and commitment
• Credit, money and (pseudo-)anonymity
• Cooperation, punishment and immigration
• Long-term relationships as safeguards
• Social games: matching and the play of finitely repeated games

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