Statistical evaluation of voting rules

DOI10.1007/S00355-015-0909-0MaRDI QIDQ5964648zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors James Green-Armytage, T. Nicolaus Tideman, Rafael Cosman

Publication date 1 March 2016

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0909-0

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of statistics to social sciences (62P25) Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14) Spatial models in economics (91B72)

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• Strategic voting and nomination
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Cites work

• Borda rule, Copeland method and strategic manipulation.
• Exact results on manipulability of positional voting rules
• Geometry of voting
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3148878 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1488103 (Why is no real title available?)
• Manipulability measures of common social choice functions
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• On the justice of decision rules
• Some further results on the manipulability of social choice rules
• Strategic voting and nomination
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• The impartial culture maximizes the probability of majority cycles
• The vulnerability of four social choice functions to coalitional manipulation of preferences

Cited in

(11)

• Cycles in synchronous iterative voting: general robustness and examples in approval voting
• Strategic voting and nomination
• Conservative statistical post-election audits
• Combining voting rules together
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1029180 (Why is no real title available?)
• Voting with rubber bands, weights, and strings
• Rationalizations of Voting Rules
• Smoothed analysis of social choice revisited
• Probabilistic models of profiles for voting by evaluation
• The negative participation paradox in three-candidate instant runoff elections
• Instant runoff voting and the reinforcement paradox

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