Strategic Export Promotion in the Absence of Government Precommitment

DOI10.2307/2527203MaRDI QIDQ4846705zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg

Publication date 22 February 1996

Published in International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/2527203

zbMATH Keywords

strategic trade policytime-consistent optimal subsidy level

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Trade models (91B60)

Recommendations

• Learning by Doing, Precommitment and Infant-Industry Promotion
• Optimal export subsidy when demand is uncertain
• Subsidized buyer credits: Atypical results in strategic trade theory
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• Strategic export policy in vertically related markets

Cited in

(6)

• The role of location choice in strategic export promotion policy: Capital liberalization incentives of exporting countries
• Optimal export subsidy when demand is uncertain
• Export promotion via official export insurance
• Learning by Doing, Precommitment and Infant-Industry Promotion
• Why Industrial Policies Fail: Limited Commitment
• Subsidized buyer credits: Atypical results in strategic trade theory

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