Strategy-proofness on restricted separable domains
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Recommendations
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Cites work
- Fair waste pricing: an axiomatic analysis to the NIMBY problem
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- On the Measurement of Polarization
- Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Voting by Committees
- Voting for voters: A model of electoral evolution
Cited in
(11)- Restricted Power - Computational Complexity Results for Strategic Defense Games
- Strategy-proofness of continuous aggregation maps
- On completeness of narrowing strategies
- Power of voters and domain of preferences where voting by committees is strategy-proof
- A unified characterization of the randomized strategy-proof rules
- Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness, and Decomposability
- Strategy-proof partitioning
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6125177 (Why is no real title available?)
- Tops-only domains
- Coding strategies, the Choquet game, and domain representability
- Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: a maximal domain for possibility
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