Strong Separations Between Broadcast and Authenticated Channels

DOI10.4230/LIPICS.DISC.2018.36MaRDI QIDQ5090929zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Julian Loss, Ueli M. Maurer, Daniel Tschudi

Publication date 21 July 2022

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.DISC.2018.36

zbMATH Keywords

broadcastcryptographyimpossibilitymulti-party computation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Distributed systems (68M14) Modes of computation (nondeterministic, parallel, interactive, probabilistic, etc.) (68Q10) Cryptography (94A60)

Recommendations

• Robust and secure broadcasting
• Authenticated broadcast with a partially compromised public-key infrastructure
• Secure Pseudonymous Channels
• Secure channels based on authenticated encryption schemes: a simple characterization
• Secure refinements of communication channels
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1231619
• Secure implementation of channel abstractions
• Strongly Secure Multiuser Communication and Authentication With Anonymity Constraints

Cites work

• Broadcast amplification
• Broadcast from minicast secure against general adversaries
• Byzantine agreement given partial broadcast
• Detectable Byzantine agreement secure against faulty majorities
• Efficient general-adversary multi-party computation
• From partial consistency to global broadcast
• On Byzantine agreement over (2,3)-uniform hypergraphs
• On the price of equivocation in Byzantine agreement
• Player simulation and general adversary structures in perfect multiparty computation
• The Byzantine Generals Problem
• The Weak Byzantine Generals Problem
• Towards a theory of consistency primitives

Cited in

(1)

• Broadcast amplification

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