Sufficient conditions for Nash implementation

DOI10.1007/S100580100055MaRDI QIDQ1601994zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Steven R. Williams

Publication date 25 February 2003

Published in Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://purl.umn.edu/1430

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumrestricted preferencestwo-step procedure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Cooperative games (91A12) Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

• On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation
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Cited in

(9)

• Full Nash implementation of neutral social functions
• On constant Maskin monotonic social choice functions
• A comment on the Nash program and the theory of implementation
• Procedurally fair implementation under complete information
• Robust coalitional implementation
• Reconsidering two-agent Nash implementation
• Nash implementation via hyperfunctions
• A general concept of procedural fairness for one-stage implementation
• Realization and Nash Implementation: Two Aspects of Mechanism Design

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