Taxing platforms with multi-homing

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2025.102478MaRDI QIDQ6855523zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Y. Saito, Yeming Zhang

Publication date 20 February 2026

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2025.102478

zbMATH Keywords

mixed-homingnetwork externalitytaxationtwo-sided markets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

Cites work

• A theoretical analysis on two‐sided duopoly platforms and tax regimes
• Armstrong meets Rochet-Tirole: on the equivalence of different pricing structures in two-sided markets
• On revenue and welfare dominance of ad valorem taxes in two-sided markets
• Platform competition with endogenous homing
• Two-sided markets, competitive bottlenecks and exclusive contracts

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