The basic approval voting game
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Recommendations
Cites work
- Approval voting: three examples
- Comparison of scoring rules in Poisson voting games
- Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
- Multi-stage voting, sequential elimination and Condorcet consistency
- Policy convergence under approval and plurality voting: the role of policy commitment
- Sophisticated voting and equilibrium refinements under plurality rule
- Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control
- Strong equilibrium outcomes of voting games are the generalized Condorcet winners
- When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable?
Cited in
(11)- Threshold voting leads to type-revelation
- Equilibria in Doodle polls under three tie-breaking rules
- Strongly sincere best responses under approval voting and arbitrary preferences
- Piercing numbers in approval voting
- Approval voting and Arrow's impossibility theorem
- Approval as an intrinsic part of preference
- Who Wins and Loses Under Approval Voting? An Analysis of Large Elections
- The framing of elections: cooperation vs. competition
- Electing a representative committee by approval ballot: an impossibility result
- Bargaining through approval
- Simple games with many effective voters
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