The bilateral consistent prekernel for NTU games

DOI10.1006/GAME.2000.0757MaRDI QIDQ1581908zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Gooni Orshan, José M. Zarzuela

Publication date 10 October 2000

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2000.0757

zbMATH Keywords

bilateral consistent prekernelNash bargaining solutionNTU games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• A Simplified Bargaining Model for the n-Person Cooperative Game
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• An Ordinal Bargaining Set for Games Without Side Payments
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• Existence of general bargaining sets for cooperative games without side payments
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• Independence of irrelevant expansions
• Monotonicity and independence axioms
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• On the reduced game property and its converse
• Potential, Value, and Consistency
• Reinterpreting the kernel
• Stability and the Nash solution
• The bargaining problem
• The consistent Shapley value for hyperplane games
• The kernel and bargaining set for convex games
• The kernel of a cooperative game

Cited in

(7)

• Fuzzy games: a characterization of the core
• Payoff-dependent balancedness and cores
• The Bilateral Consistent Prekernel, the Core, and NTU Bankruptcy Problems
• The multi-core, balancedness and axiomatizations for multi-choice games
• Two characterizations of the consistent egalitarian solution and of the core on NTU games
• A comparison of the average prekernel and the prekernel
• The unit-level-core for multi-choice games: the replicated core for TU games

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