The evolution of exchange.

DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00112-1MaRDI QIDQ1427490zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Assaf Ben-Shoham, Roberto Serrano, Oscar Volij

Publication date 14 March 2004

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00112-1

zbMATH Keywords

EfficiencyStochastic stabilityEnvyHousing problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Evolutionary games (91A22) Stochastic models in economics (91B70)

Recommendations

• Stable processes of exchange
• Dynamics, stability, and foresight in the Shapley-Scarf housing market
• Stochastic stability in assignment problems
• Decentralized trade, random utility and the evolution of social welfare
• Coalitional stochastic stability in games, networks and markets

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3826915 (Why is no real title available?)
• A new solution to the random assignment problem.
• An evolutionary analysis of backward and forward induction
• An evolutionary model of bargaining
• Bilateral Trading Processes, Pairwise Optimally, and Pareto Optimality
• Evolution with State-Dependent Mutations
• Evolutionary dynamics and backward induction
• Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• On cores and indivisibility
• On the formation of interaction networks in social coordination games.
• Pairwise, t-Wise, and Pareto Optimalities
• Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
• Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics
• The Evolution of Conventions
• The Evolution of Walrasian Behavior

Cited in

(14)

• Stochastic stability in assignment problems
• Decentralized trade, random utility and the evolution of social welfare
• Coalitional stochastic stability in games, networks and markets
• A dynamic recontracting process for multiple-type housing markets
• The anonymous core of an exchange economy.
• Dynamics, stability, and foresight in the Shapley-Scarf housing market
• Stochastic stability in best shot network games
• Decentralised exchange, out-of-equilibrium dynamics and convergence to efficiency
• Games with coupled populations: an experiment in continuous time
• Evolution and jump in a Walrasian framework
• Evolutionary game theory
• Stable processes of exchange
• In defense of DEFECT.
• House exchange and residential segregation in networks

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