The replicator equation in stochastic spatial evolutionary games

DOI10.1016/J.SPA.2022.11.013MaRDI QIDQ6351128arXivFDO

Authors Yu-Ting Chen

Publication date 12 October 2020

Published in arXiv

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.SPA.2022.11.013

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Interacting random processes; statistical mechanics type models; percolation theory (60K35) Evolutionary games (91A22) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

arXiv classification

math.PRq-bio.PE

Abstract: We study the multi-strategy stochastic evolutionary game with death-birth updating in expanding spatial populations of size $Noinfty$. The model is a voter model perturbation. For typical populations, we require perturbation strengths satisfying $1/Nllwll1$. Under appropriate conditions on the space, the limiting density processes of strategy are proven to obey the replicator equation, and the normalized fluctuations converge to a Gaussian process with the Wright-Fisher covariance function in the limiting densities. As an application, we resolve in the positive a conjecture from the biological literature that the expected density processes approximate the replicator equation on many non-regular graphs.

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