Time consistent Shapley value imputation for cost-saving joint ventures

MaRDI QIDQ3172369zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors David W. K. Yeung

Publication date 5 October 2011

Full work available at URL http://mathnet.ru/eng/mgta44

zbMATH Keywords

corporate joint venturecost savingdynamic stabilityShapley value

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cited in

(9)

• Two level cooperation in dynamic network games with partner sets
• Joint venture's dynamic stability with application to the Renault-Nissan alliance
• Construction of Dynamically Stable Solutions in Differential Network Games
• Co-development ventures: optimal time of entry and profit-sharing
• Characteristic functions in cooperative differential games on networks
• Time-inconsistency of cooperative networks in differential games
• About the instability of cooperative communication structures in differential network games
• Differential network games with different types of players behavior
• Shapley value for differential network games: theory and application

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