Towards a dichotomy for the possible winner problem in elections based on scoring rules
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- Towards a Dichotomy of Finding Possible Winners in Elections Based on Scoring Rules
- Possible and necessary winner problems in iterative elections with multiple rules
- Taking the final step to a full dichotomy of the possible winner problem in pure scoring rules
- Dichotomy for pure scoring rules under manipulative electoral actions
- The scoring rules in an endogenous election
- On the relationship of the Condorcet winner and positional voting rules
- Scoring run-off paradoxes for variable electorates
- Condorcet efficiency of constant scoring rules for large electorates
Cites work
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- A Short Introduction to Computational Social Choice
- Algorithms for the coalitional manipulation problem
- Average parameterization and partial kernelization for computing medians
- Dichotomy for voting systems
- Fixed-parameter algorithms for Kemeny rankings
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- Improved parameterized algorithms for the Kemeny aggregation problem
- Incompleteness and incomparability in preference aggregation: complexity results
- Introduction to algorithms
- Llull and Copeland Voting Computationally Resist Bribery and Constructive Control
- New candidates welcome! Possible winners with respect to the addition of new candidates
- On problem kernels for possible winner determination under the k-approval protocol
- On the parameterized complexity of multiple-interval graph problems
- Parameterized computational complexity of Dodgson and Young elections
- Parametrized complexity theory.
- Reflections on multivariate algorithmics and problem parameterization
- Swap bribery
- Taking the final step to a full dichotomy of the possible winner problem in pure scoring rules
- The shield that never was: societies with single-peaked preferences are more open to manipulation and control
- When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?
Cited in
(43)- On the relationship of the Condorcet winner and positional voting rules
- Selections from ordered sets
- Multivariate complexity analysis of Swap Bribery
- On the evaluation of election outcomes under uncertainty
- The possible winner problem with uncertain weights revisited
- Weighted partial order oriented three-way decisions under score-based common voting rules
- Control complexity in Borda elections: solving all open cases of offline control and some cases of online control
- Preference elicitation and robust winner determination for single- and multi-winner social choice
- New complexity results on aggregating lexicographic preference trees using positional scoring rules
- Parameterized dichotomy of choosing committees based on approval votes in the presence of outliers
- Computing possible and certain answers over order-incomplete data
- The nearest neighbor Spearman footrule distance for bucket, interval, and partial orders
- The complexity of online manipulation of sequential elections
- On the exact amount of missing information that makes finding possible winners hard
- Comparing and aggregating partial orders with Kendall tau distances
- Ranking chain sum orders
- Studies in Computational Aspects of Voting
- The nearest neighbor Spearman footrule distance for bucket, interval, and partial orders
- Determining possible and necessary winners given partial orders
- Multivariate complexity analysis of swap bribery
- On the hardness of bribery variants in voting with CP-nets
- Towards a Dichotomy of Finding Possible Winners in Elections Based on Scoring Rules
- Prices matter for the parameterized complexity of shift bribery
- The possible winner problem with uncertain weights
- On problem kernels for possible winner determination under the k-approval protocol
- Taking the final step to a full dichotomy of the possible winner problem in pure scoring rules
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6928629 (Why is no real title available?)
- How hard is it to tell which is a Condorcet committee?
- Complexity of and algorithms for the manipulation of Borda, Nanson's and Baldwin's voting rules
- On the Exact Amount of Missing Information that Makes Finding Possible Winners Hard
- Balanced stable marriage: how close is close enough?
- Scoring run-off paradoxes for variable electorates
- Possible and necessary winner problems in iterative elections with multiple rules
- The possible winner with uncertain weights problem
- Incompleteness and incomparability in preference aggregation: complexity results
- Complexity of conformant election manipulation
- Approval-based committee voting under incomplete information
- Bribery in elections with randomly selected voters: hardness and algorithm
- Complexity of control by partitioning veto elections and of control by adding candidates to plurality elections
- Jérôme Lang's contributions at the interface of economic theory with artificial intelligence
- Dichotomy for voting systems
- Complexity of manipulation and bribery in judgment aggregation for uniform premise-based quota rules
- Kernelization complexity of possible winner and coalitional manipulation problems in voting
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