Towards a quantitative analysis of security protocols

DOI10.1016/J.ENTCS.2006.07.009MaRDI QIDQ7014417zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors P. Adão, Paulo Mateus, Tiago B. S. Reis, Luca Viganò

Publication date 11 March 2025

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.ENTCS.2006.07.009

zbMATH Keywords

security protocolsDolev-Yao intrudercomputational protocol analysisprobabilistic intrudersymbolic protocol analysis

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60) Computer security (68M25)

Cites work

• A probabilistic polynomial-time process calculus for the analysis of cryptographic protocols
• Global Computing
• Logic for Programming, Artificial Intelligence, and Reasoning
• On the security of public key protocols
• Programming Languages and Systems
• Reconciling two views of cryptography (The computational soundness of formal encryption)
• The NRL Protocol Analyzer: An Overview
• Theory of Cryptography
• Theory of Cryptography
• Weakening the perfect encryption assumption in Dolev-Yao adversaries

Cited in

(2)

• Modeling and reasoning about an attacker with cryptanalytical capabilities
• Quantitative aspects of programming languages and systems over the past 2⁴ years and beyond

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