Towards a quantitative analysis of security protocols
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Cites work
- A formalization of off-line guessing for security protocol analysis
- A probabilistic polynomial-time process calculus for the analysis of cryptographic protocols
- Computationally sound, automated proofs for security protocols
- On the security of public key protocols
- Reconciling two views of cryptography (The computational soundness of formal encryption)
- The NRL Protocol Analyzer: An Overview
- Theory of Cryptography
- Theory of Cryptography
- Towards a formal treatment of secrecy against computational adversaries
- Weakening the perfect encryption assumption in Dolev-Yao adversaries
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