Truthful Scheduling Mechanisms for Powering Mobile Crowdsensing

DOI10.1109/TC.2015.2419658MaRDI QIDQ2985704zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Kai Han, Chi Zhang, Jun Luo, Menglan Hu, Bharadwaj Veeravalli

Publication date 16 May 2017

Published in IEEE Transactions on Computers (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1109/TC.2015.2419658

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Performance evaluation, queueing, and scheduling in the context of computer systems (68M20)

Cited in

(4)

• An incentive mechanism design for mobile crowdsensing with demand uncertainties
• Optimal contract design for effort-averse sensors
• Budget-feasible Sybil-proof mechanisms for crowdsensing
• Budget-feasible Sybil-proof mechanisms for crowdsensing

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