Two simplified proofs for Roberts' theorem

DOI10.1007/S00355-008-0331-YMaRDI QIDQ733788zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ron Lavi, Ahuva Mu'alem, Noam Nisan

Publication date 19 October 2009

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0331-y

zbMATH Keywords

social welfaresocial choice

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

• Roberts' theorem with neutrality: a social welfare ordering approach
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Cites work

• A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context
• Characterization of ex post equilibrium in the VCG combinatorial auctions
• Optimal Auction Design
• Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation

Cited in

(16)

• Dominant strategy implementability and zero length cycles
• Balanced implementability of sequencing rules
• Roberts' theorem with neutrality: a social welfare ordering approach
• Algorithms and mechanisms for procuring services with uncertain durations using redundancy
• Incentive compatibility and strategy-proofness of mechanisms of organizational behavior control: retrospective, state of the art, and prospects of theoretical research
• Roberts' weak welfarism theorem: a minor correction
• Strategy-proofness and weighted voting
• Simple proof of two-well rigidity
• Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains
• A modular approach to Roberts' theorem
• Mechanism design with two alternatives in quasi-linear environments
• No truthful mechanism can be better than \(n\) approximate for two natural problems
• Separability and decomposition in mechanism design with transfers
• Two-player incentive compatible outcome functions are affine maximizers
• Selling mechanisms for a financially constrained buyer
• Dominant strategy implementation with a convex product space of valuations

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