Ultraproducts and aggregation
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- Impossibility results for infinite-electorate abstract aggregation rules
- The model-theoretic approach to aggregation: impossibility results for finite and infinite electorates
- Arrovian aggregation of generalised expected-utility preferences: (im)possibility results by means of model theory
- Generalized ultraproduct and Kirman-Sondermann correspondence for vote abstention
- Arrovian aggregation models
Cites work
- A further note on Arrow's impossibility theorem
- Arrow's theorem for economic environments and effective social preferences
- Arrow's theorem with restricted coalition algebras
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3115891 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3976693 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3981120 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 50586 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3482337 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3286895 (Why is no real title available?)
- Intergenerational social choice without the Pareto principle
- On Arrow-type impossibility theorems with infinite individuals and infinite alternatives
- Precisely dictatorial social welfare functions
- Quasitransitive intergenerational choice for economic environments
- Social choice and individual values
- Social welfare functions for economic environments with and without the Pareto principle
- Stability of Aggregation Procedures, Ultrafilters, and Simple Games
- The elementary theory of finite fields
- The Single Profile Analogues to Multi Profile Theorems: Mathematical Logic's Approach
- Wilson's theorem for economic environments and continuous social preferences
Cited in
(26)- Ultraproducts and small bound perturbations
- Intertemporal equity and the extension of the Ramsey criterion.
- The birth of social choice theory from the spirit of mathematical logic: Arrow's theorem in the framework of model theory
- Arrovian aggregation of generalised expected-utility preferences: (im)possibility results by means of model theory
- Infinite populations, choice and determinacy
- Topological manipulators form an ultrafilter
- Arrow's theorem, countably many agents, and more visible invisible dictators
- Acyclicity, anonymity, and prefilters
- Superset-robust collective choice rules
- Preference aggregation and atoms in measures
- Arrow's decisive coalitions
- Quasi-stationary social welfare functions
- Addendum to L. Lauwers and L. van liedekerke, ``ultraproducts and aggregation [J. Math. Econ. 24 (3) (1995) 217-237]
- The possibility of Paretian anonymous decision-making with an infinite population
- Aggregating infinitely many probability measures
- Unanimity, anonymity, and infinite population
- AGGREGATION OF PREFERENCES IN CRISP AND FUZZY SETTINGS: FUNCTIONAL EQUATIONS LEADING TO POSSIBILITY RESULTS
- Generalized ultraproduct and Kirman-Sondermann correspondence for vote abstention
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3977127 (Why is no real title available?)
- Impossibility results for infinite-electorate abstract aggregation rules
- The model-theoretic approach to aggregation: impossibility results for finite and infinite electorates
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1746897 (Why is no real title available?)
- Additive representation of separable preferences over infinite products
- A representative individual from Arrovian aggregation of parametric individual utilities
- Filters in abstract aggregation with infinite sequences of signals
- Judgment aggregators and Boolean algebra homomorphisms
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