Universal forgery and key recovery attacks on ELmD authenticated encryption algorithm

DOI10.1007/978-3-662-53887-6_13MaRDI QIDQ2958128zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Aslı Bay, Oğuzhan Ersoy, F. Karakoç

Publication date 1 February 2017

Published in Advances in Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2016 (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-53887-6_13

zbMATH Keywords

authenticated encryptionblock cipher based encrypt-linear-mix-decrypt authentication modeCAESARELmDforgery attackkey recoverysecurity analysis of ELmD

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60) Authentication, digital signatures and secret sharing (94A62)

Recommendations

• Elme: a misuse resistant parallel authenticated encryption
• Exploiting the leakage: analysis of some authenticated encryption schemes
• Forgery and subkey recovery on CAESAR candidate iFeed
• Collision attacks against CAESAR candidates. Forgery and key-recovery against AEZ and Marble
• Key recovery attacks on recent authenticated ciphers

Cites work

• A Meet-in-the-Middle Attack on 8-Round AES
• Biclique Cryptanalysis of the Full AES
• Collision attacks against CAESAR candidates. Forgery and key-recovery against AEZ and Marble
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1682693 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1759272 (Why is no real title available?)

Cited in

(1)

• Practical low data-complexity subspace-trail cryptanalysis of round-reduced PRINCE

Describes a project that uses

Uses Software

• ELmD

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