Values of games in partition function form

DOI10.1007/BF01770871MaRDI QIDQ1245166zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Roger B. Myerson

Publication date 1977

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01770871

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

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Cites work

• N‐person games in partition function form

Cited in

(55)

• Overlapping coalitions, bargaining and networks
• Rational bargaining in games with coalitional externalities
• Four-part partition games by transformation of variables in Silverman's game: Details of some examples
• How Can Cooperative Game Theory Be Made More Relevant to Economics? : An Open Problem
• Dividends and weighted values in games with externalities
• A set of axioms for a value for partition function games
• Externalities, potential, value and consistency
• Outside options, component efficiency, and stability
• Expected fair allocation in farsighted network formation
• Sharing the surplus in games with externalities within and across issues
• Games with externalities: games in coalition configuration function form
• Efficient bidding with externalities
• Marginal Contributions in Games with Externalities
• On the externality-free Shapley-Shubik index
• Cooperation in problems of common-pool resources
• The class of efficient linear symmetric values for games in partition function form
• Fair allocation in networks with externalities
• A new look at the study of solutions for games in partition function form
• Winning coalitions in plurality voting democracies
• Flexible network rules for identified externalities
• Efficiency in correlated equilibrium
• Efficiency in coalition games with externalities
• Complexity of computing the Shapley value in partition function form games
• Sharing the surplus: An extension of the Shapley value for environments with externalities
• Consistency and the core in games with externalities
• Marginality and convexity in partition function form games
• Fair division in the presence of externalities
• Games with multiple alternatives applied to voting systems
• N‐person games in partition function form
• On a class of vertices of the core
• Values for environments with externalities -- the average approach
• The lattice of embedded subsets
• An extension of the solidarity value for environments with externalities
• THE CONSENSUS VALUE FOR GAMES IN PARTITION FUNCTION FORM
• THE SHAPLEY VALUE FOR PARTITION FUNCTION FORM GAMES
• The private value of a patent: a cooperative approach
• Random partitions, potential, value, and externalities
• Minimum cost spanning tree games and spillover stability
• Population monotonic allocation schemes for games with externalities
• A Class of Efficient Values for Games in Partition Function Form
• The banzhaf – coleman index for games withralternatives
• The Banzhaf value in the presence of externalities
• THE AGENCIES METHOD FOR MODELING COALITIONS AND COOPERATION IN GAMES
• Some advances in cooperative game theory: indivisibilities, externalities and axiomatic approach
• A coalition formation value for games in partition function form
• Shapley value for TU-games with multiple memberships and externalities
• Power indices for multicandidate voting games
• Externalities and compensation: Primeval games and solutions
• The Shapley value for arbitrary families of coalitions
• A value for games with \(n\) players and \(r\) alternatives
• The Shapley-Shubik index for simple games with multiple alternatives
• Expectation formation rules and the core of partition function games
• The extended and generalized Shapley value: Simultaneous consideration of coalitional externalities and coalitional structure
• A decomposition for the space of games with externalities
• AN AXIOM SYSTEM FOR A VALUE FOR GAMES IN PARTITION FUNCTION FORM

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