Vector-valued games: characterization of equilibria in matrix games

DOI10.1007/S00186-025-00892-5MaRDI QIDQ6971761zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Giovanni P. Crespi, Daishi Kuroiwa, Matteo Rocca

Publication date 13 June 2025

Published in Mathematical Methods of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/S00186-025-00892-5

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriavector optimizationvector-valued game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Equilibrium refinements (91A11)

Cites work

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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4149922 (Why is no real title available?)
• On the notion of proper efficiency in vector optimization
• Pareto equilibria for bimatrix games
• Proper efficiency and the theory of vector maximization
• Proper efficiency with respect to cones
• Properly efficient Nash equilibrium in multicriteria noncooperative games
• The equilibria of a multiple objective game
• The geometry of Pareto efficiency over cones
• The study of Pareto equilibria for multiobjective games by fixed point and Ky Fan minimax inequality methods
• Weak Pareto equilibria for generalized constrained multiobjective games in locally FC-spaces

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