Veto-based delegation

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2007.02.004MaRDI QIDQ936643zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Tymofiy Mylovanov

Publication date 19 August 2008

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.02.004

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationdelegationimplementationno monetary transfersprincipal-agent relationshipveto power

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Optimal Delegation
• Authority and Communication in Organizations
• Equilibrium informativeness in veto games
• Repeated delegation
• Optimal contingent delegation

Cites work

• Authority and Communication in Organizations
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4025100 (Why is no real title available?)
• Stochastic mechanisms in settings without monetary transfers: the regular case
• Strategic Information Transmission

Cited in

(16)

• Optimal signaling with cheap talk and money burning
• Cheap talk with an exit option: a model of exit and voice
• Equilibrium informativeness in veto games
• Money burning in the theory of delegation
• Expert advising under checks and balances
• Optimal limited authority for principal
• Optimal delegation via a strategic intermediary
• Optimal sequential delegation
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3873013 (Why is no real title available?)
• Eliciting information from a committee
• The role of commitment in bilateral trade
• Regulating a monopolist with uncertain costs without transfers
• Countervailing conflicts of interest in delegation games
• A dynamic optimization approach to delegation with an application to volunteer contracts
• The optimality of (stochastic) veto delegation
• Information transmission and countervailing biases in organizations

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