Pages that link to "Item:Q1753294"

The following pages link to Strategy-proofness and efficiency for non-quasi-linear and common-tiered-object preferences: characterization of minimum price rule (Q1753294):

Displaying 7 items.

• Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences (Q785519) (← links)
• Pareto efficient combinatorial auctions: dichotomous preferences without quasilinearity (Q1995288) (← links)
• When are efficient and fair assignment mechanisms group strategy-proof? (Q2291174) (← links)
• Random assignments on preference domains with a tier structure (Q2338670) (← links)
• A characterization of the Vickrey rule in slot allocation problems (Q6074886) (← links)
• Multi-object auction design beyond quasi-linearity: leading examples (Q6102578) (← links)
• Strategy-proof mechanism design with non-quasi-linear preferences: ex-post revenue maximization for an arbitrary number of objects (Q6168825) (← links)