When are efficient and fair assignment mechanisms group strategy-proof? (Q2291174)
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7160429
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| default for all languages | No label defined |
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| English | When are efficient and fair assignment mechanisms group strategy-proof? |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7160429 |
Statements
When are efficient and fair assignment mechanisms group strategy-proof? (English)
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30 January 2020
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object allocation
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efficiency
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fairness
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group strategy-proofness
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0.8953803777694702
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0.8559344410896301
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0.8539987206459045
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0.8426399827003479
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0.8334048390388489
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