When are efficient and fair assignment mechanisms group strategy-proof?

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2019.11.008MaRDI QIDQ2291174zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jun Zhang

Publication date 30 January 2020

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.11.008

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencyfairnessgroup strategy-proofnessobject allocation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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Cites work

• A new solution to the random assignment problem.
• A sufficient condition for the equivalence of strategy-proofness and nonmanipulability by preferences adjacent to the sincere one
• Domains, ranges and strategy-proofness: the case of single-dipped preferences
• Efficient and fair assignment mechanisms are strongly group manipulable
• Existence of equilibria in economies with a local public good
• Fairness and efficiency in strategy-proof object allocation mechanisms
• Fairness and group-strategyproofness clash in assignment problems
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078983 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3095897 (Why is no real title available?)
• Impossibilities for probabilistic assignment
• Incentive properties for ordinal mechanisms
• Matching with single-peaked preferences
• On a conjecture by Gale about one-sided matching problems
• Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
• Social choice and individual values
• Strategy-proof and fair assignment is wasteful
• Strategy-proofness and efficiency for non-quasi-linear and common-tiered-object preferences: characterization of minimum price rule
• Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
• Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
• The single-peaked domain revisited: a simple global characterization

Cited in

(10)

• Allocating group housing
• Efficient and fair assignment mechanisms are strongly group manipulable
• Group incentive compatibility in the housing market problem with weak preferences
• Group strategy-proof probabilistic voting with single-peaked preferences
• Fairness and efficiency in strategy-proof object allocation mechanisms
• Robust ex-post Pareto efficiency and fairness in random assignments: two impossibility results
• Fairness and group-strategyproofness clash in assignment problems
• Reputation-based conditional compassion promotes cooperation in spatial public goods games
• Fairness and efficiency of the random serial dictatorship on preference domains with a tier structure
• The equivalence between random priority and probabilistic serial rule on restricted preference domains

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