On a conjecture by Gale about one-sided matching problems
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Publication:2277345
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(90)90070-ZzbMath0725.90003WikidataQ61440681 ScholiaQ61440681MaRDI QIDQ2277345
Publication date: 1990
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
symmetryPareto optimalityassignmentstrategy-proofnessMatching problemsprobability distribution over pure matchings
Decision theory (91B06) Edge subsets with special properties (factorization, matching, partitioning, covering and packing, etc.) (05C70) Group preferences (91B10) Social choice (91B14)
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