Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification
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Publication:6076910
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Cited in
(6)- Mechanism design with costly verification and limited punishments
- Optimal allocation with costly inspection and discrete types under ambiguity
- Legal Assignments and Fast EADAM with Consent via Classic Theory of Stable Matchings
- On the expected payment of mechanisms for task allocation
- Optimal multi-unit allocation with costly verification
- Information transmission in persuasion models with imperfect verification
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