Mechanism design with costly verification and limited punishments

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2020.105000zbMath1432.91033OpenAlexW3124280153WikidataQ126299365 ScholiaQ126299365MaRDI QIDQ2295836

Yunan Li

Publication date: 17 February 2020

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105000

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designcostly verificationlimited punishments

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Related Items (4)

Testing alone is insufficient ⋮ Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification ⋮ Optimal multi-unit allocation with costly verification ⋮ Selecting a winner with external referees

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• Information Acquisition in Auctions

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