Optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2013.09.015zbMath1295.91053OpenAlexW1990752384MaRDI QIDQ2439904

Rakesh V. Vohra, Mallesh Pai

Publication date: 26 March 2014

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2013.09.015

zbMATH Keywords

multidimensional mechanism designbudget constraintsreduced formoptimal auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (33)

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Cites Work

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• Allocation Mechanisms and the Design of Auctions
• On the Implementability of Reduced Form Auctions
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• Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders
• Optimal Auction Design
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• Ironing, Sweeping, and Multidimensional Screening
• Assigning Resources to Budget-Constrained Agents
• Generalized Reduced-Form Auctions: A Network-Flow Approach
• High bids and broke winners

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