Optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers
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Publication:2439904
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2013.09.015zbMATH Open1295.91053OpenAlexW1990752384MaRDI QIDQ2439904FDOQ2439904
Authors: Mallesh Pai, Rakesh V. Vohra 
Publication date: 26 March 2014
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2013.09.015
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Cited In (51)
- Polyhedral clinching auctions and the AdWords polytope
- Optimal and efficient mechanisms with asymmetrically budget constrained buyers
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Optimal constrained bidding
- Optimization and mechanism design
- A simple mechanism for a budget-constrained buyer
- Symmetric reduced-form voting
- Optimal and Efficient Parametric Auctions
- Auctions with loss‐averse bidders
- Tractable stochastic analysis in high dimensions via robust optimization
- The dynamics of bidding markets with financial constraints
- Efficient ex post implementable auctions and English auctions for bidders with non-quasilinear preferences
- Equilibrium existence and expected payoffs in all-pay auctions with constraints
- Optimal sale across venues and auctions with a buy-now option
- Equitable rent division on a soft budget
- Multi-unit auctions with budget limits
- Budget-Management Strategies in Repeated Auctions
- Constrained equilibrium in a bidding problem
- Dynamic Mechanism Design with Budget-Constrained Buyers Under Limited Commitment
- Towards characterizing the deterministic combinatorial constrained efficient space
- Auction design for value maximizers with budget and return-on-spend constraints
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Buyers' welfare maximizing auction design
- Reduced form implementation for environments with value interdependencies
- Bayesian persuasion: reduced form approach
- On the continuous equilibria of affiliated-value, all-pay auctions with private budget constraints
- Endogenous budget constraints in auctions
- Optimal auctions with endogenous budgets
- Core Pricing in Combinatorial Exchanges with Financially Constrained Buyers: Computational Hardness and Algorithmic Solutions
- Global Incentive Constraints in Auction Design
- All-pay vs. standard auctions when competing for budget-constrained buyers
- Selling to a manager and a budget-constrained agent
- Selling mechanisms for a financially constrained buyer
- Optimal dynamic mechanism design with deadlines
- Reduced-form budget allocation with multiple public alternatives
- The war of attrition and the revelation of valuable information
- Optimal auctions for asymmetrically budget constrained bidders
- Market and non-market mechanisms for the optimal allocation of scarce resources
- Ex-post optimal knapsack procurement
- Sequential second-price auctions with private budgets
- Credit contracting and bidding under wealth constraints.
- Endogenous budget constraints
- Mechanism design with costly verification and limited punishments
- An optimal auction for capacity constrained bidders: a network perspective
- First‐price auctions with budget constraints
- Efficient mechanisms with information acquisition
- A note on optimal allocation with costly verification
- Optimal Design for Multi-Item Auctions: A Robust Optimization Approach
- Auctioning big facilities under financial constraints
- Matching auction with winner's curse and imperfect financial markets
- Mechanism design with budget constraints and a population of agents
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