Optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers
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Publication:2439904
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Cites work
- Allocation Mechanisms and the Design of Auctions
- Assigning resources to budget-constrained agents
- Asymmetric reduced form auctions
- Generalized reduced-form auctions: a network-flow approach
- High bids and broke winners
- Implementation of Reduced Form Auctions: A Geometric Approach
- Ironing, Sweeping, and Multidimensional Screening
- Is subsidizing inefficient bidders actually costly?
- Market and non-market mechanisms for the optimal allocation of scarce resources
- Multiple-object auctions with budget constrained bidders
- On the Implementability of Reduced Form Auctions
- Optimal Auction Design
- Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
- Optimal auction with financially constrained buyers
- Optimal auctions for asymmetrically budget constrained bidders
- Selling to risk averse buyers with unobservable tastes
- Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders
- The optimal mechanism for selling to a budget-constrained buyer
Cited in
(55)- Selling to a manager and a budget-constrained agent
- Optimal auctions for asymmetrically budget constrained bidders
- Sequential second-price auctions with private budgets
- A note on optimal allocation with costly verification
- Constrained equilibrium in a bidding problem
- Optimization and mechanism design
- A simple mechanism for a budget-constrained buyer
- Efficient ex post implementable auctions and English auctions for bidders with non-quasilinear preferences
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6381703 (Why is no real title available?)
- Auctioning big facilities under financial constraints
- Auction design for value maximizers with budget and return-on-spend constraints
- Bayesian persuasion: reduced form approach
- First‐price auctions with budget constraints
- Mechanism design with costly verification and limited punishments
- Tractable stochastic analysis in high dimensions via robust optimization
- Post-auction investment by financially constrained bidders
- Optimal and Efficient Parametric Auctions
- Efficient mechanisms with information acquisition
- On the continuous equilibria of affiliated-value, all-pay auctions with private budget constraints
- Core pricing in combinatorial exchanges with financially constrained buyers: computational hardness and algorithmic solutions
- Auctions with loss‐averse bidders
- Equitable rent division on a soft budget
- Optimal design for multi-item auctions: a robust optimization approach
- Matching auction with winner's curse and imperfect financial markets
- Dynamic mechanism design with budget-constrained buyers under limited commitment
- Endogenous budget constraints in auctions
- Market and non-market mechanisms for the optimal allocation of scarce resources
- The dynamics of bidding markets with financial constraints
- Budget-management strategies in repeated auctions
- Buyers' welfare maximizing auction design
- Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders
- Constrained signaling in auction design
- Reduced-form budget allocation with multiple public alternatives
- All-pay vs. standard auctions when competing for budget-constrained buyers
- Auctions vs. fixed pricing: competing for budget constrained buyers
- Optimal and efficient mechanisms with asymmetrically budget constrained buyers
- Credit contracting and bidding under wealth constraints.
- Equilibrium existence and expected payoffs in all-pay auctions with constraints
- Optimally constraining a bidder using a simple budget
- Towards characterizing the deterministic combinatorial constrained efficient space
- Reduced form implementation for environments with value interdependencies
- Multi-unit auctions with budget limits
- Global Incentive Constraints in Auction Design
- Optimal sale across venues and auctions with a buy-now option
- Symmetric reduced-form voting
- An optimal auction for capacity constrained bidders: a network perspective
- The war of attrition and the revelation of valuable information
- Optimal constrained bidding
- Ex-post optimal knapsack procurement
- Optimal auctions with endogenous budgets
- Selling mechanisms for a financially constrained buyer
- Mechanism design with budget constraints and a population of agents
- Optimal dynamic mechanism design with deadlines
- Endogenous budget constraints
- Alea iacta est: auctions, persuasion, interim rules, and dice
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