Global Incentive Constraints in Auction Design

DOI10.2307/1913518zbMath0605.90044OpenAlexW1997122265MaRDI QIDQ3743064

John Hardman Moore

Publication date: 1984

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1913518

zbMATH Keywords

adverse selectionauction designglobal incentive constraints

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mathematical economics (91B99)

Related Items (6)

Non-linear pricing by convex duality ⋮ Adverse selection without single crossing: monotone solutions ⋮ Mechanism design with weaker incentive compatibility constraints ⋮ Small- and large-stakes risk aversion: Implications of concavity calibration for decision theory ⋮ Combinatorial auctions without money ⋮ Auctions with a stochastic number of bidders

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