Auctions with a stochastic number of bidders
From MaRDI portal
Publication:579094
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(87)90113-XzbMath0624.90003MaRDI QIDQ579094
John McMillan, R. Preston McAfee
Publication date: 1987
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
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