Entry and R{\&}D in procurement contracting
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Publication:1196191
Recommendations
- Cost-Reducing Investment, Optimal Procurement and Implementation by Auctions
- Competitive bidding with entry costs
- First-price equilibrium and revenue equivalence in a sequential procurement auction model
- Entry and competition effects in first-price auctions: theory and evidence from procurement auctions
- Competition for Procurement Contracts and Underinvestment
Cites work
- A class of differential games for which the closed-loop and open-loop Nash equilibria coincide
- Auctions with a stochastic number of bidders
- Auctions with entry
- Comparing Auctions for Risk Averse Buyers: A Buyer's Point of View
- Competitive bidding with entry costs
- Duopoly information equilibrium: Cournot and Bertrand
- Entry and R{\&}D in procurement contracting
- Optimal research for Cournot oligopolists
- Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
Cited in
(27)- Auctions with costly information acquisition
- Auction design with opportunity cost
- Contracts with endogenous information
- Why a simple second-price auction induces efficient endogenous entry
- Contest with pre-contest investment
- Entry and R{\&}D in procurement contracting
- A mixed integer model of bidding strategies for outsourcing
- Equilibria in second-price auctions with private participation costs
- First-price auction implements efficient investments
- Strategically equivalent contests
- Efficient investments in the implementation problem
- The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions
- Auctions with entry and resale
- Optimal use of rewards as commitment device when bidding is costly
- Competitive bidding with entry costs
- Commitment in Procurement Contracting
- Cost-Reducing Investment, Optimal Procurement and Implementation by Auctions
- Procurement Mechanisms with Post-Auction Pre-Award Cost-Reduction Investigations
- Asymmetry and revenue in first-price auctions
- Rent seeking in public procurement
- Mechanism design with general ex-ante investments
- Information disclosure in all-pay contests with costly entry
- Auction design with shortlisting when value discovery is covert
- Information acquisition and full surplus extraction
- Auctioning long-term projects under financial constraints
- When can less be more? Inducing dealer responses in RFQ platforms
- Equilibria in second price auctions with participation costs
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