Entry and R{\&}D in procurement contracting
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Publication:1196191
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(92)90100-VzbMath0759.90017MaRDI QIDQ1196191
Publication date: 17 December 1992
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) General equilibrium theory (91B50)
Related Items (21)
Auctions with entry and resale ⋮ Procurement Mechanisms with Post-Auction Pre-Award Cost-Reduction Investigations ⋮ Equilibria in second price auctions with participation costs ⋮ A mixed integer model of bidding strategies for outsourcing ⋮ Information acquisition and full surplus extraction ⋮ Efficient investments in the implementation problem ⋮ Mechanism design with general ex-ante investments ⋮ Information disclosure in all-pay contests with costly entry ⋮ Auction design with shortlisting when value discovery is covert ⋮ Equilibria in second-price auctions with private participation costs ⋮ Entry and R{\&}D in procurement contracting ⋮ Asymmetry and revenue in first-price auctions ⋮ The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions ⋮ First-price auction implements efficient investments ⋮ Auctions with costly information acquisition ⋮ Auction design with opportunity cost ⋮ Contracts with endogenous information ⋮ Why a simple second-price auction induces efficient endogenous entry ⋮ Contest with pre-contest investment ⋮ Optimal Use of Rewards as Commitment Device When Bidding Is Costly ⋮ Strategically equivalent contests
Cites Work
- Competitive bidding with entry costs
- Auctions with a stochastic number of bidders
- Duopoly information equilibrium: Cournot and Bertrand
- Auctions with entry
- Optimal research for Cournot oligopolists
- A class of differential games for which the closed-loop and open-loop Nash equilibria coincide
- Entry and R{\&}D in procurement contracting
- Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
- Comparing Auctions for Risk Averse Buyers: A Buyer's Point of View
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