The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions
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Publication:2482919
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2006.11.005zbMath1135.91353WikidataQ56658234 ScholiaQ56658234MaRDI QIDQ2482919
Publication date: 28 April 2008
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://dipot.ulb.ac.be/dspace/bitstream/2013/9001/1/ce-0002.pdf
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
Related Items
Ranking sealed high-bid and open asymmetric auctions, Revenue and efficiency effects of resale in first-price auctions, Revenue equivalence in asymmetric auctions, Asymmetric first price auctions
Cites Work
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- Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information
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