A Study of Collusion in First-Price Auctions

DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00136MaRDI QIDQ4512695zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Martin Pesendorfer

Publication date 17 January 2001

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00136

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric auctionsauctioncontractsside payments

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economic models of real-world systems (e.g., electricity markets, etc.) (91B74)

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Cited in

(47)

• Optimal collusion-proof auctions
• Bid rotation and collusion in repeated auctions.
• Tacit collusion in repeated auctions.
• Collusion through communication in auctions
• Commitment in first-price auctions
• Debarment and collusion in procurement auctions
• Estimating unobserved individual heterogeneity using pairwise comparisons
• How accurately do structural asymmetric first-price auction estimates represent true valuations?
• Designing a double auction mechanism for the re-allocation of emission permits
• How to translate results from auctions to procurements
• On stability of efficient cartel mechanisms in first-price auctions with uninformed bidders
• Revenue-superior variants of the second-price auction
• Bidder collusion
• Efficient collusion in repeated auctions with communication
• Efficient collusion in optimal auctions
• Ratifiability of efficient collusive mechanisms in second-price auctions with participation costs
• The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions
• Uniqueness of the equilibrium in first-price auctions
• The study on the collusion mechanism of auction and it's efficiency
• Collusion, Exclusion, and Inclusion in Random-Order Bargaining
• Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective
• Weak and strong multimarket bidding rings
• Strategic collusion in auctions with externalities
• On the possibility of welfare-enhancing hard core cartels
• Optimal bidding in auctions of mixed populations of bidders
• Auctions
• The Affiliation Effect in First-Price Auctions
• Using Bid Rotation and Incumbency to Detect Collusion: A Regression Discontinuity Approach
• Comparing competition and collusion: a numerical approach.
• Collusion enforcement in repeated first‐price auctions
• A survey on obstacles and difficulties of practical implementation of horizontal collaboration in logistics
• Optimal collusion under cost asymmetry
• Bidder collusion at first-price auctions
• A theory of entry dissuasion
• Cardinal Bayesian allocation mechanisms without transfers
• Secret versus public rings in common value auctions
• Shutting-out-proofness in object allocation problems with money
• Allocation without transfers: a welfare-maximizing mechanism under incomplete information
• Transnational machine learning with screens for flagging bid-rigging cartels
• Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values
• When speed is of essence: perishable goods auctions
• Testing collusion and cooperation in binary choice games
• The econometrics of auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders
• Effects of competition in first-price auctions
• Self-enforced collusion through comparative cheap talk in simultaneous auctions with entry
• Ranking sealed high-bid and open asymmetric auctions
• Private monitoring in auctions

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