A Study of Collusion in First-Price Auctions

DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00136zbMath0962.91030OpenAlexW3124119300MaRDI QIDQ4512695

Martin Pesendorfer

Publication date: 17 January 2001

Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00136

zbMATH Keywords

auctioncontractsasymmetric auctionsside payments

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economic models of real-world systems (e.g., electricity markets, etc.) (91B74)

Related Items (30)

Effects of competition in first-price auctions ⋮ Efficient collusion in repeated auctions with communication ⋮ Self-enforced collusion through comparative cheap talk in simultaneous auctions with entry ⋮ Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective ⋮ Ranking sealed high-bid and open asymmetric auctions ⋮ Private monitoring in auctions ⋮ Weak and strong multimarket bidding rings ⋮ How accurately do structural asymmetric first-price auction estimates represent true valuations? ⋮ Optimal collusion under cost asymmetry ⋮ On the possibility of welfare-enhancing hard core cartels ⋮ A survey on obstacles and difficulties of practical implementation of horizontal collaboration in logistics ⋮ Collusion through communication in auctions ⋮ Designing a double auction mechanism for the re-allocation of emission permits ⋮ Optimal bidding in auctions of mixed populations of bidders ⋮ Bidder collusion at first-price auctions ⋮ Tacit collusion in repeated auctions. ⋮ Efficient collusion in optimal auctions ⋮ Ratifiability of efficient collusive mechanisms in second-price auctions with participation costs ⋮ Cardinal Bayesian allocation mechanisms without transfers ⋮ Auctions ⋮ The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions ⋮ How to translate results from auctions to procurements ⋮ Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values ⋮ Uniqueness of the equilibrium in first-price auctions ⋮ Commitment in first-price auctions ⋮ The econometrics of auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders ⋮ Optimal collusion-proof auctions ⋮ Debarment and collusion in procurement auctions ⋮ Estimating unobserved individual heterogeneity using pairwise comparisons ⋮ Revenue-superior variants of the second-price auction

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