On the possibility of welfare-enhancing hard core cartels

DOI10.1007/S00712-011-0263-3zbMATH Open1294.91048OpenAlexW2093378673MaRDI QIDQ405789FDOQ405789

Authors: Iwan Bos, Erik Pot 

Publication date: 5 September 2014

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-011-0263-3

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zbMATH Keywords

antitrustcartelswelfare-enhancing collusion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54) Welfare economics (91B15)

Cites Work

• A Study of Collusion in First-Price Auctions
• On the possibility of welfare-enhancing hard core cartels

Cited In (4)

• On the possibility of welfare-enhancing hard core cartels
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Collusion under product differentiation

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