Stable Cartels

DOI10.2307/2526507zbMath0592.90006OpenAlexW4229908809MaRDI QIDQ3722209

Nicholas Economides, M.-P. Donsimoni, Herakles M. Polemarchakis

Publication date: 1986

Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/59b24ba39f5bade720c8baf0d2f03807e277c501

zbMATH Keywords

stabilityuniquenessequilibriumsizecollusioncartel stabilitystable cartels,

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items

Impact of equity and equality on stability and collusion in a decentralized network ⋮ Disadvantageous syndicates and stable cartels: The case of the nucleolus ⋮ The persistence of social strategies under increasing competitive pressure ⋮ Either with us or against us: experimental evidence on partial cartels ⋮ Imperfect collusion in monitored markets with free entry ⋮ Core-stable rings in second price auctions with common values ⋮ Cartel instability and periodic price shocks ⋮ A dynamic approach to cartel formation ⋮ Single-payoff farsighted stable sets in strategic games with dominant punishment strategies ⋮ Countervailing power? Collusion in markets with decentralized trade ⋮ Membership rules and stability of coalition structures in positive externality games ⋮ Private versus public companies with strategic CSR ⋮ A note on cartel stability and endogenous sequencing with tacit collusion ⋮ Complete Versus Partial Collusion in Competing Coalitions ⋮ COMPETITION POLICY AND CARTEL SIZE ⋮ When imperfect collution is profitable